STUDIES IN ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE.*
II. TiHE RULE MAKING

AUTHORITY.

XII.
The larger part of the five hundred amendments to the
R. S. C. 1883 cannot be grouped together as the product of concerted movements or general agitations for reform; unlike the
changes reviewed in the foregoing sections, each of them stands
more or less alone, with a story of its own. They can, however,
for convenience, be classified according to their character rather
than their origins, and such a method brings out the fact that
they fall, roughly, into five or six general categories whose
diversity is further evidence of the advantages of the rule-making
system over the regulation of procedure difectly by statute.
To a student of the rule-making authority as a new development in the machinery of legislation the most striking of these
categories, though not the most numerous or the most weighty
in its content, is that which contains amendments made with the
purpose of counteracting various judicial decisions in the
Supreme Court and the House of Lords. Frequently a branch
of the Court of Appeal, or a Judge in Chambers, or some other
tribunal, in the consideration of a specific set of facts, will interpret an existing Rule or practice in such a way as to impair the
usefulness or to restrict the scope for which it was apparently
intended; sometimes such a decision cannot be avoided when the
ordinary canons of interpretation are applied to a loosely worded
passage in the Rules. W\hen that occurs and the resulting inconvenience is brought to the attention of the Rule Committee, the
usual course is the promulgation of an alteration in the wording
of the Rule, or an addition to it, which will make it clear, so that
without expressly overruling decisions, the Committee is able
effectually to overcome their binding force. This is a use of the
rule-making power which was probably not contemplated by its
*Continued from the March issue, 63 UNIERsI'Y
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creators. but as the power has been so exercised no less than
twenty-five times since 1883 without question, the method seems
to be accepted as clearly intra vires.
Among the amendments in this class the one that borders
nearest on the domain of substantive law is the addition made in
1896 to the Rule permitting joinder of parties. Order XVI,
Rule i, as formulated in 1883. read as follows:
"All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in
whom any right to relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, and judgment may be given for
such one or more of the plaintiffs as n.y be found to be entitled
to relief," etc.
In the Nineties-a line of decisions interpreted this Rule as
limiting the joinder to parties who claimed the same relief,
thereby materially restricting the classes of claims that might be
joined under the Rule. It was considered necessary to remove
the obstacle, so in 1896 the Rule was altered to read:
"'All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in
whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether

jointly, severally, or in the alternative. where if such persons

brought separate actions any common question of law or fact
would arise; providcd that, if upon the application of any defendant it shall appear that such joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of an action, the Court or a Judge Ymay order separate trials, or make such other order as may be expedient, and

judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs
as may be found to be entitled to relief," etc.

Thus the doctrine of 1873, that the sole limit for the right
claims and parties should be the convenience of trial, was
join
to
emphasized and re-affirmed, and the effect of the decisions that
sought to hamper it swept away. Since 1896 joinder has been
permitted under the new Rule in many cases in which, under the
prior interpretation, it would have been refused.
It is interesting to examine the decisions which brought
about this result, as the instance is typical. The first was
3 9
Smurthwaite v. Hannay, in the House of Lords, " in which it
1 [z894] Appeal Cases, 494.
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was decided that the old Order XVI, Rule i, did not permit of a
joinder in one action by sixteen persons (nine being shippers and
seven consignees, of cotton under various bills of lading) against
the shipowners, for short delivery. Lord Chancellor Herschell
in his judgment, after reading the words of the Rule, said:
"'This conveys to my mind the idea that the relief claimed
by the plaintiffs who are joined is to be the same relief,"
and Lord Russell of Killowen, C. J., also felt that the Rule was
too broadly worded, as tnder it
"it would he possible to join any number of plaintiffs with distinct causes of action against any number of defendants charged
on distinct grounds of liability."
The limitation declared in that case was followed without hesitation by the Privy Council in Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Nazigation Company v.Tsune Kijinza,; '" an action under Lord
Campbell's Act, in which sixty-two different groups of persons
joined, clainiiug.4amages for injury done to them by the drowning of sixty-two seamen whom they represented, and alleging
that a collision between two ships was due to the negligence of
the defendant's servants. The following year, in a Divisional
Court sitting to hear County Court appeals, Lord Russell was
obliged to follow his House of Lords judgment in a case of most
distressing character. Fifty miners were drowned in the sudden
flooding of the seam in which they were working, and their representatives joined in an action under Lord Campbell's Act,
brought in the local County Court. The County Court Rule on
joinder of plaintiffs. Order III. Rule i, was identical with Order
XVI, Rule i, in the High Court Rules, and the Divisional Court
held, Carterv. Rigbv and Coinpany,3 that the joinder could not
be allowed under the Rule as interpreted by the House of Lords.
The Lord Chief Justice said:
"Iam sorry to feel obliged to come to this conclusion, for
although I cannot, doubt that Siurthwaite v. Hannay was
rightly decided, I think it in every way desirable that Order III,
[xi8ql" Appeal Cases. 661.

1&)6] 2 Q. B. 113.
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Rule i, should be so framed as to permit such a joinder as that
here in question. subject to the control of the Court where inconvenience or injustice might arise from following that course.
and I hbpe that the Rule Committee may see fit to amend Order
III, Rule i."
The case was taken up to the Court of Appeal, but Lord Esher
diniissed it with the comment that:
-'The tloute of Lords has put a construction upon it, and
we cannot go beyond or behind that decision."

At the beginning of the next sittings of the Court, October
26, 1896, the Supreme Court Rule Committee met once more,
and acting upon the suggestion of Lord Russell isstted the amendnient to Order XVI. Rule i, of the Supreme Court Rules which
has been quoted and whose effect has been described; a few
weeks later, November i9. the identical amendment to Order III,
Rule i, of the County Court Rules was made by the County
Court Rule Committee and approved by the Lord Chancellor.
In this manner a quasi-legislative body, composed of eight
judges, two barristers and a solicitor, altered the law of the land
as it had been declared by the highest tribunal in the Empire.' " Another amendment in this class dealing with parties is that
made in 1911 definitely'extending third party procedure in a
direction where there had been a conflict among courts. The
third party procedure was introduced by Section Twenty-four of
the Judicature Act, 1873, and its scope was at first not clearly
u nderstooKd. In Fo-aler v. Knoop, in the Exchequer Division in
1877, a consignee under a bill of lading was sued for delay in
'A few decisions under the Rule as altered are: Drincqbier v. Wood,
i918rt Ch. 393. where four plaintiffs, holders of several debentures, joined
in an action against a company, alleging false statements in the prospectus
and claiming damages; Oxford & Cambridge v. Gill, [i8g9] i Ch. 55, which
was an action by the two Universities to restrain the use of the words
'Oxford and Cambridge" in the title of the defendant's publications; Walters

v. Green. [1899] 2 Ch. 696. in which several employers moved for an injunction to restrain certain officials of trade unions from watching and besetting certain places for the purpose of persuading workmen not to work for
the plaintiffs: and Ellis v. Duke of Bedford, [igoi] Appeal Cases i, where
six several growers of fruit, on behalf of themselves and all other such
growers, sued the owner of Covent Garden Market for alleged invasion of
their rights in it.
SL.AW Timurs RItoa'S, 219 (187,7).
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unloading; he brought in as third party the person to whom lie
had transferred thL bill of lading while the goods were still
afloat; that person desired to bring in as fourth party another
one to whom he had, in turn, transferred the bill of lading while
the goods were still afloat. The court, at first doubtful, perinitted the step after argument by Mr. (now the Right Honorable
Sir) Arthur Wilson, the draftsman of most of the 1875 Rules.
But in the same year, in Wlalker v. Balfour,9 4 in the Common
Pleas Division, a similar permission was refused, Mr. Justice
Denman declaring it was not open to defendants to postpone the
plaintiff indefinitely by bringing in other persons toties quoties.
Many years later Mr. Justice Eve in the Chancery Division decided in Klawanski v. Premier Company 95 that the third party
could, if he chose, step aside and bring in a fourth party to
defend. After that case a Rule was added to Order XVI to
authorize the procedure and to set at rest any doubt as to its
correctne.s. 0 0 Under the new Rule "third party notices" have
been issued in an action by successive parties even up to the
eighth and ninth party. The Rule is not of frequent applicatioi,
hut it is exceedingly useful in cases where there have been successive transfers of mercantile documents, or of leases containing repair clauses, etc.
It will be recalled that one of the improvements introduced
sued in the firm name and to require, thereupon, that the partners
"25

RrPoit., 5it

(18.).
(19tx) 94. This was an action by A against a company for transferring shares on their books from A's name to B's without
A's consent. The company, having acted on orders of -transfer purporting
to be signed by A, but presented by B. brought in B as a third party from
whom indemnity could be claimed in the event of A's succeeding. B, in
turn, issued a "third party notice" to C, a brother of the plaintiff, on whose
representations he had presented the orders of transfer to the company as
valid. At the trial C actually appeared and defended the action, taking the
chief part in bringing the facts of the case to light, and the plaintiff's action
was dismissed. The case was reported on the raising of a question as to
whether the court had jurisdiction to order the plaintiff to pay the fourth
party's costs.
Order XVI, Rule r A: "Where any person served with a third party
notice by a defendant or by a third party tinder these Rules claims to be
entitled to contribution or indemnity over against any person not a party to
the action he may by leave of the court or a judge issue a third party notice
to that effect: and the preceding Rules as to third party procedure shall apply
mutdtis ,nutandis to every notice so issued."
YEExCLY
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by the 1875 Judicature Rules was to allow a partnership to be
must enter their appearances individually; service might be
effected either upon any partner, or upon the person in control
of the firm's place of business, and if a person served "as a partner" failed to appear, he was penalized by having his personal
property made liable to execution under a judgment against the
firm. In most actions against partnerships it was the practice to
effect service upon the person in control of the place of business
and serve him "as a partner," although frequently he was not a
partner at all, but merely an employee. In an action undefended
by the firm, therefore, that employee ran the risk of having his
private property taken in execution, as he would be a person
served "as a partner," who failed to appear. The exact combination of facts did not arise in a very large number of actions, but
it was familiar enough to cause the practice masters to issue a
regulation in 1887, to the effect that when those conditions were
present the Central Office should accept from the employee an
appearance "with a denial of partnership," which would still
leave the plaintiff free to sign judgment against the firm itself
for default of appearance. In 189 o this device was brought to
the attention of the Court of Appeal in Davies and Company v.
Andri and Company,'9 1 and they ruled that there could be no
such thing as a conditional appearance; the person served, they
said, either is a partner or is not a partner; if he is a partner lie
must appear unconditionally, and if he is not a partner lie must
not appear at all. That decision put the employee to the risk of
having to prove, when execution against his private property was
applied for, that he was not a partner-a risk augmented by the
mysteries of the law of partnership. A few weeks after the
decision, an employee in control of his firm's place of business
was served "as a partner," and wishing to deny the partnership
he tendered to the Central Office an appearance reading as follows: "Enter an appearance for A, ser'ed as a partner in the
firm of B & Co.." but the appearance was refused under the
authority of Davies v. Andri and that refusal was sustained by
'24

Q. B. D. 598 (i8o).
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a Divisional Court, in Aliden v. Prentis and Company,398 on the
ground that the appearance must be unconditional to be accepted. The tables were now turned, as the plaintiff soon discovered, foi the situation now was that there was an unconditional appearance entered which would bar him from obtaining
his judgment for default of appearance, and the firm was given,
without the asking, more time before having to submit to
judgment.
The anomalies in the situation were pointed out in a series
of three articles in the Solicitors' Journal ' by Mr. Francis A.
Stringer of the Central Office. Not long afterward, Parliament
enacted the codifying Partnership Act, 189o, and the Rule Committee decided to revise completely the Rules on suits by and
against firms, scattered through the White Book, with a view to
removing inconsistencies.
It is supposed that Lord Justice
Lindley (the author of Lindley on Partnership) was the prime
mover in this decision. On June 19, 189i, the new Rules were
signed; they combine in a new Order, Order XLVIII A, eleven
Rules affecting partnerships as parties. They remove the difficulties raised by Da-vies v. Andre and Alden %'.Prentis by expressly permitting any person served "as a partner" to enter "an
appearance under protest, denying that he is a partner," without
prejudicing the plaintiff's right to sign judgment against the firm
itself for failure to appear.'"
Not so comprehensive a change as to parties, but one affecting a Rule applied with equal frequency, was made in 1893 to
Order XVI, Rule 8. That Rule, reproduced from Section 42
(9) of the Chancery Procedure Act, 1852, allows all trustees to
sue and be sued in actions touching the property they represent,
without joining as parties their cestuis que trust (subject to the
34 SOLICITORS" JOVRXAL, 541 (189o).
Vol. 34. pp. 32o. c4t and 562 (June, x89o).
'Order XLVIII A, Rule 7. What the plaintiff must do is to serve the

employee both "as a partner and "as the person in control," giving written
notice to that effect under the new Order XLVIII A, Rule 4. Therefore.
nlthoughi the conditional appearance may block him from treating the employee as a partner. the plaintiff may still take his judgment against the firm
because his writ has been served upon the person in control of the place of
business.
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power of the court to order beneficiaries made parties where
advisable). In Francis v. Harrison. 1889,401 it was laid down
as a general rule. despite this, that a trustee mortgagee does not
sufficiently represent his cestuis que trust as defendant in a
foreclosure action. In that case the trustee happened to be a
bankrupt, but the judgment of North, J., was broad enough in
its terms to aplply to all foreclosure actions, and was so applied
several times in chambers after 1889. The Rule Committee
evidently thought this an unnecessary limitation, ror in 1893 the
following sentence was added to the end of the former Rule:
"This Rule shall apply to trustees, executors and administrators sued in proceedings to enforce a security by foreclosure
or otherwise."
Turning from the subject of parties to that of the indorsement on the writ two amendments are found in the category
under discussion. The first overturns a decision of the Court
,,f Appeal with remarkable brevity. The procedure for summary judgment on liquidated money claims, developed out of the
Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, had been extended in 1883, by adding the following line to Order III, Rule 6:
"or in actions for the recovery of land, with or without a claim
for rent or mesne profits, by a landlord against a tenant whose
tern has expired or has been duly determined by notice to quit,
or against persons claiming tinder such tenant";
the object being to provide a summary method for the recovery
of tenements in cases which are practically never defended. It
was early held in chambers, in 1884, bv Mr. Justice Mathew, who
was a member of the 1881 Procedure Committee which recommended the extension, that this part of the Rule was never
intended to apply to cases where the lease had been determined
which the lease had run out to its natural termination; and in
two cases of forfeiture he refused leave tq indorse the claim
by a forfeiture for non-payment of rent, but only to those inspecially tinder Order III, Rule 6.402 The Court of Appeal gave
'43 CIL Div. 183 (1889).
*"Burnsv. Walford. W:ExLY
WEEKLY Noms (1884), 34.

NOTES

(1884), 31, and Mansergh v. Rimell,
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binding force to this view ten years later in Arden v. Boyce,
where the exact point was carried up from the Judge in Chambers through the Divisional Court, Lord Justice Davey explaining that:
"The principle appears to be that the court will not give a
sunnary judgment in cases where an action for recovery of
land is based on a forfeiture."

But in January, 1902, when the Rule Committee were clearing
away the weeds that had sprung up around the 1897 summons
for directions, they added a very short phrase to Order III, Rule
6, which made its land clause read as follows:
"or in actions for the recovery of land, with or without a claim
for rents or mesne profits, by a landlord against a tenant whose
terni has expired or has been duly determined by notice to quit.
or has becomc liable to forfeiture for non-Payment of rent,"
etc.
and those few words removed Arden v.Boyce from the precedent hooks without further ado.
A few months later, July, 1902, the Rule Committee made
an amendment affecting the indorsement of unliquidated claims.
Under the Common Law Procedure Acts there was no such thing-is a judgment for want of an appearance; the practice had been
for the Court to order an appearance to be entered for the abgent
defendant, then to order the plaintiff to file his statement of
claim, and then to give judgment against the defendant for failing to plead. The Judicature Rules of 1875, and again in x883,
contained a section improving the facilities for judgments by
default. Order XIII, Rule 5.provided that where the writ was
indorsed with a claim
"for detention of goods and pecuniary damages, or either of
them,"
and the defendant failed to appear, the plaintiff might, without
having to file a statement of claim, sign interlocutory judgment,
and proceed to assess his damages by writ of inquiry or in any
other way directed by the court.
40[jig%] 1Q. B.

79&.
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This Rule was the subject of argument in a case of Eyre v.
Evre, before Mr. Justice Bucknill in 1901.404 There the claim
was for pecuniary damages for slander, and no appearance being
entered the plaintiff signed interlocutory judgment and issued his
writ of inquiry under Order XIII. Rule 5. The defendant then
sought to have the interlocutory judgment set aside on the ground
that Order XIII, Rule 5, applied only when the pecuniary damages were for the detention of goods, not for other forms of
injury. The judge was inclined to agree that the defendant's
contention was sound, but being confronted with the fact that
the practice not only of the English but of the Irish and Colonial
courts for twenty-five years, under Order XIII, Rule 5, had been
to apply it to all cases where pecuniary damages were claimed, he
avoided the difficulty by setting aside the judgment under the
general power of the court to set aside default judgments on
proper terms. 4 3 At the same time he said that Order XIII,
Rule 5, if it was intended -to apply to the case in hand, was "about
as badly worded as it possibly could be," and he promised to
"communicate with the Rule Committee, pointing out to them
the difficulty which had arisen, in the hope that they would deal
with similar cases." His representations to the Committee (of
which he was not himself a member) resulted in an amendment
to Order XIII, Rule 5, among the Rules of July, 19o2, which
made it apply thenceforth to all cases
"where the writ is indorsed with a claim for pecuniary damages oly, or for detention of goods with or without a claim for
pecunimry damages,"
and no doubts have' since been thrown upon the meaning of the
Rule. The Solicifors' Journal said of the case at the time: "It
will stand almstalone among reported cases, because Mr. Justice Bucknill withheld his decision on the real point at issue with
the avowed purpose of aifpwing time for the matter to be brought
to the attention of the Rule Committee in preference to giving a
Reported in 45 SOLICITORS' JOURMAL, 653 (July 13, 1901).
Order XXVII. Rule is.
"45 SOLICIToRS' JOURNAL, 648 (July 13, Igor).
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judgment which would have the effect of upsetting the estab'40
lished practice on an important point.
Two amendments of some importance as to interlocutory
matters fall within this category. The first relates to the obligation of infant parties to make discovery of documents and to
answer interrogatories Under the Rules in Order XXXI. Under
the old Chancery rules, in effect before the Judicature Acts, they
had never been obliged to give discovery or to answer interrogatories, and for that historical reason it was held repeatedly
in the High Court that neither the guardian ad item 4t0 7 nor the
next friend40 8 of an infant could be compelled to answer, although it was also conceived that they were not the "parties to
the action" to whom Order XXXI applied. Two cases explicitly
exempted the infant himself from filing an affidavit of documents04 9 and from answering interrogatories, 410 solely because
lie could not have been compelled to do so before the Judicature
Acts. All these memories of the dead hand of the old chancery
practice were dissolved away by a short new Rule added to the
end of Order XXXI in 1893, which states:
"This Order shall apply to infant plaintiffs and defendants, and to their next friends and guardians .ad litern."
The other amendment, an early one, touches the liability of
a plaintiff to give security for costs. The Judicattire Rules do
not prescribe the cases in which he may be ordered to do so, but
the well-known rule that a plaintiff resident out of the jurisdiction may be ordered to give such security is perpetuated by the
section of the Judicature Act saving existing procedure not repealed. In 1879, in a case of Redondo v. Chaytor,4 11 the
Oucen's Bench was called upon to decide whether a plaintiff
should be ordered to give security for costs, who, though ordinarily resident in Spain, was then temporarily residing in Engv. Little, ii Q. B. D. 251 (1883). Answers to interrogatories.
'In re Corsellis. 52 L. J. Ch. 399 (1883), and Dyke v. Stephens, 30
Ch. D. i89 (185). both as to discovery of documents.
eIngram

Curtis v. Mundy. [ 18921 2 Q. B. 17&

Mayor v. Collins,

du 4

Q.

24

Q.'B. D. .361 (i8go).

B. D. 453 (1879).
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land, and Lord Justice Thesiger, after an exhaustive review of
the authorities both in common law and in equity, delivered a
judgment to the effect that there was a well established rule of
practice that a plaintiff who is residing even temporarily within
the jurisdiction of the court cannot be compelled to give security
for costs. Several years later. in Ebrard v. Gassier,4 12 the
Chancery Division with great reluctance admitted it was bound
by this decision in a case where the plaintiffs were a firm resident
in Mexico, one of whose members had gone to England solely
for the purpose of prosecuting the action. The Rule Committee
corrected this state of things in the following year, 1885, by a
new Rule which recites that:
"A plaintiff ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction may
be ordered to give security for costs though he may be temporarily resident within the jurisdictlon."41a
Sometimes a decision upon an old rule of practice is the
means of calling attention to possible changes in it, as the following shows. Under the old chancery practice, of which an illustration is Hinings V. 11inings,"4 it had been the custom when a
legatee of a sum less than £20 died, and no administration issued
upon his estate, for the court to pay out the sum to his next of
kin without requiring an administration to be raised. In i9ol
it was sought to persuade a judge in the Chancery Division, by
the analogy of the old practice, to pay out a small sum of money
which was in a fund in court to the next of kin of the person
41 5 but
entitled, withbut requiring an administration to be raised,
the application was refused, the court conceiving it could not
make such an extension of its powers. The watchful Rule Committee, in the following year (when some of the best amendments
were written), then passed a Rule which in effect overruled the
41
decision by extending the practice to cover the order sought.
Now any sum in court less than £ioo will be paid out to the next
"028 Ch. Div.

232

(1884).

- Order LXV, Rule 6 A.
2 Hemming & Miller, 32 (1864).
Frog!ey v. Phillips, 50 WEEKLY REPORTER, 184

Order XXII, Rule z8 A.

(19o1).
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of kin of an intestate distributee, without requiring letters of
administration to be taken out, provided the total assets of the
deceased, including his share of the fund in court, do not exceed
£xoo. This means a most acceptable saving of expense in cases
where the pennies count.
Sodcau v. Shorey41 T was a case that might have caused
sheriffs great concern, but for the prompt action of the Rule
Committee. In levying execution under a ficri facias a sheriff
seized some goods belonging not to the debtor but to the debtor's
brother, who at once claimed them. The sheriff notified the
execution creditor, who wired back: "Admit claim; please withdraw." The sheriff, being threatened by the real owner withan action for trespass, then took out an interpleader summons
under which he applied for an order to stop the action, but the
order was refused; on appeal the Court of Appeal decided the
sheriff could not so protect himself, as an interpleader proceeding
would merely bring in, to contest the owner's claim, the creditor
who had already admitted it. This would have thrown upon
sheriffs generally an extra risk in the prosecution of their duties,
so t he-ule Committee was prevailed upon to act, and less than
three weeks after Lord Esher's judgment was delivered-a draft
Rule was signed to meet the situation and free the sheriffs from
the risk the decision imposed.418 It provides that:
"WVhen the execution creditor has given notice to the sheriff or his officer that he admits the claim of the claimant, the
sheriff may thereupon withdraw from possession of the goods
claimed, and may apply for an order protecting him from any
action in respect of the said seizure and possession of the said
goods, and the Judge or Master may make any such order as
may be just and reasonable in respect of the same.
The protection thus afforded seems to have caused satisfaction,
as no cases have been reported under the new Rule.
Personal service of writs out of the jurisdiction is one of
the facilities regulated by the R. S. C. which arouses great curiosity in an American; the privilege is limited to certain classes of
-'74 LAw Ti~ms RETORTs, 240 (March

-' Order LVII, Rule 16 A.

18, 1896).
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cases enumerated in Order XI, Rule i.

One of these, as worded

in 1883, was

"whenever the whole subject matter of the action is land situate within the jurisdiction.""'"
This was always considered to refer only to actions in which the
title to the land came into question, but in 1912 that restriction
was removed in a curious way. Under a settlement, certain
estates in Yorkshire were limited to the sons of X in tail male,
first to A and his sons, then to B and his sons, then to C and his
sons, etc., successively. A son was born to A in California, and
A registered the infant there as a legitimate child. The other
sons of X thereupon brought an action in the High Court to
perpetuate testimony tending to prove the child was illegitimate,
so that when A might die the evidence should not have been lost.
As the infant was in California, they sought to obtain an order
for service upon him out of the jurisdiction, on the theory that
the land in question was situate within, but the Court of Appeal
decided the Rule did not apply; this was an action relating
merely to czidence, they said, not to the title to the land.4 " The
resulting inconvenience must have been plainly apparent not only
to the court, but to the Rule Committee as well (Cozens-Hardy,
M. R., being at the time a member of both), for just nineteen
days later, April 3, 1912, the Committee published an amendment adding to the Rule the following words:
"or the perpetuation of testimony relating to the title to land
within the jurisdiction."

While the application of this part of the Rule is rare, the amendment is of interest as holding, together with the interpleader
amendment just noted, the record for swiftness of arrival.
Another amendment in the same Order is distinguished for
the fact that it overrules more decisions than any other in this
category. It is the one authorizing service of interlocutory summonses, orders and notices out of the jurisdiction, in all actions
"Order XI, Rule

i

(a).

INSlingsby v. Slingsby, [1912] 2 Ch. 2.
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in which the writ itself might be so served.4 21 This was made in
19o9 and upset the whole previous course of the practice under
the Order, as established by numerous reported decisions from
1883 down.
A number of other amendments in this category might be
described, but they require more intimate acquaintance with
their context than it is possible to give here.42 They all have
this in common, that they were issued by the Rule Committee to
destroy the effect of judicial decisions without expressly referring to them. The power to do this is not altogether a power to
overrule, as that would be inherent only in a higher court; the
word "counteract" is g happier description, and the foregoing
paragraphs illustrate how, in exercising their delegated legislative powers, the Rule Committee can counteract the decisions of
any court in England, not being circumscribed even by the judgments of the House of Lords.
. XiII.
Of the other five categories the one of most consequence is
that containing the amendments which create new departures in
procedure--what might be called the solid substance of procedure, as distinguished from mere rules of practical direction.
Many such have been noticed above, in the historical review of
I Order XI, Rule 8 A.
'Among them are five amendments on costs and six of a miscellaneous
nature:
Order LXV, Rule .26 A (i9o3), which counteracts Re Pollard, 20 Q. B.
D. 656 (1888), and Re Collyer-Bristow & Co., [19oi] 2 K. B. 839; Order
LXV, Rule 27 (17a) (19o2), Wickstced v. Biggs, 54 L. J. Ch. 967 (1885), and
Brown v. Sewcll 16 Ch. Div. 517 (o88o); Order LXV, Rule 27 (17b) (1902),
Silkstone Coal o. v. Edey, [1901] 2 Ch. 652; Order LXV, Rule 27 (29A)
(1909), Sadd v. Griffin, [19o8] 2 K. B. $io; Order LXV, Rule 27 (48) (I886),
Re lHarrison, 33 Ch. Div. 52 (886).
Order XVIII, Rule 2 (i888), on joinder of claims, which counteracts
Sutcliffe v. Wood, 53 L J. Ch. 97o (1884); Order XXII, Rule 2 (1913), on
payment into court, Penny v. Wimbledon, [1898] 2 Q. B. 212, and Beadon v.
Capital Syndicate, 28 TimEs LAw REPORTS, 394, 427 (1912); Order XXXV,
Rule 5 (f) (1894), on interpleader orders, Hood v. Yates, [1894] I Q. B.
240; Order XXXVI. Rule i A (1884), on abolition of venue, Philips v. Beale,
26 Ch. Div. 621 (1884); Order LI. Rule 24 (1899), on solicitors, Re DavidSon, [18N9] 2 Q. B. IoS; Order LVIII, Rule iS A (1885), on chancery chambers, Cummins v. Heron, 4 Ch. Div. 787 (1876); and White v. Witt, $ Ch.
Div. 189 (1877).
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the period from 1883 to the present, as they are the strands out
of which the history of procedure is woven. But there are many
which found their way into the fabric independently of each
other and were not contributed as part of any general design,
and some of these are worthy of attention.
Among them the most characteristic is that which deprived
the plaintiff of the right to select the place of trial of his action.
Local venue had been abolished in 1875, and the plaintiff was
then given the right to name, in his statement of claim, the
county or place in which he proposed the action should be tried,
which would then bind the defendant unless the court could be
persuaded, for good cause, to alter it. In 1897, when the summons for directions was reconstructed, it was provided that the
place of trial should be one of the matters dealt with on the hearing of that summons, but the defendant was still obliged to accept the place nominated by the plaintiff unless he could convince
the master that the balance of convenience was heavy enough on
his side to warrant a change. When the pleading Orders were
smoothed out in 1902, the place of trial Rule was altered to read:
"There shall be no local vcnue for the trial of any action,
but in ez'cry action in every Division the place of trial
shall be fixed by the court or a judge.""'42
so that the selection of the place of trial was taken completely
out of the plaintiff's hands. It is now a matter solely for the
master to decide on the summons for directions; in doing so he
is guided, it is true, by the same considerations he had to weigh
previously in hearing the defendant's application to alter the
place of trial, but lie approaches the matter now without being
influenced by the thought that, all other things being equal, it is
for the plaintiff to choose the place. The master is free to fix
the place wherever it will be most convenient for the majority
of the parties and their witnesses to attend. This is one of the
further developments of the tendency under the judicature Acts
to take the control of the litigation out of the hands of the plaintiff and repose it entirely in the court.
O'Order XXXVI, Rule i.
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Procedure on motions for new trials has been altered considerably since 1875. Under the first Judicature Rules 4 24 all
such motiohs went to a Divisional Court-the modem form of
the old sittings in banc. 25 In 1883 a distinction was made between actions in which the trial had been before a judge alone,
and those in which there had been a jury trial; in the latter the
old procedure was retained, but in the former it was ruled that
the motion should be made direct to the Court of Appeal and
should be in form an appeal. In 189o a fresh Judicature Act 42'
reduced the jurisdiction of Divisional Courts, the intention being
to do away with them altogether by degrees, and in conformity
to it a Rule was added to Order XXXIX in 1892 directing that
after jury trials as well the motion for a new trial should be
direct to the Court of Appeal and should be in form an appeal.
At the same time this important clause was added, that
"upon the hearing of such motion the Court of Appeal shall
have all such powers as are exerciseable by it upon the hearing
of-an appeal."
To appreciate the full force of this it is necessary to read Order
LVIII, Rule 4, which bestows the powers so exerciseable. It
says:
"The Court of Appeal shall have all the powers and duties
as to amendment and otherwise of the High Court, together
with full discretionary power to receive further evidence upon
questions of fact

.

.

by oral examination in court, by affi-

,' Order XXXIX, Rule 1.
' in the King's Bench and the Probate Divisions, Divisional Courts w
constituted by §17 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, i87"6, consist of two or
three judges of the Division. Any two judges may sit together as a Divisional
Court, and there may be more than one Divisional Court sitting in the same
Division at the same time. In the King's Bench Division the Lord Chief
Justice allots the work of the Divisional Courts among the puisne judges,
as the need arises; often a Divisional Court will be constituted to sit for a
half hour in the morning before taking the reular business. In the Chancery Division it is not customary to have Divisional Courts. In the Probate
Division there are only two judges, and they sit together whenever a little
work accumulates for a Probate Divisional Court. There has always been
a prejudice against the system of Divisional Courts, and their jurisdiction
has been steadily reduced in favor of sending applications direct to the Court
of Appeal. At present the bulk of their work consists in hearing appeals
from inferior courts, and their powers and procedure are regulated by Order
LIX of the R. S. C., 1883.
W.5 & 54 Vict., C.44, S. .
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davit or by deposition... . The Court of Appeal shall have
power to draw inferences of fact and to give any judgment and
make any order which ought to have been made, and to make
such further or other order as the case may require. The powers aforesaid may be exercised by the said court notwithstanding that the notice of appeal may be that part only of the decision may be reversed or varied, and such powers may also be
exercised in favor of all or any of the respondents or parties,
although such respondents or parties may not have appealed
from or complained of the decision. .
In the light of this comprehensive Rule, the complete
assimilation of motions for new trials to appeals explains the
comparative rarity of re-trials in English courts. In 1913 Order
XXXIX was re-cast and the wording of the opening Rules condensed into two short Rules.
A provision wholly original and unique, for the protection
of infant and weak-minded plaintiffs, was made in the R. S. C.
1883. That was Order XXII, Rule 15, which directed that if a
sum of money was recovered in. the Queen's Bench Division by
an infant or a "person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition" the judge might, at or after the trial, order the sum to be
paid into court, and from time to time make such order as to the
income or the principal as he might deem proper. This wise
Rule was intended to protect helpless incompetents from the
ignorance of inexperienced guardians and the wiles of sharp
practitioners, especially in the large class of cases known as
"running-down actions." It frequently occurred that a child
would be injured by a tram or oninibus; the parents, poor, would
entrust the matter to one of the solicitors who are specialists in
negligence cases. The father would be named the child's next
friend to prosecute the action; and if any sum of money was
recovered, it would be paid by the defendant to the solicitor, to
be hanrded over to the father as guardian. 'Many cases came to
light in which the money so recovered was frittered away by the
solicitor in extra work for which there was no need, or in which
the guardian was persuaded to make some investment which
turned out to be for the solicitor's benefit and not for the child's;
in some instances there were even fcund.,"aigreenients between

STUDIES IN ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE

the solicitor and an equally unscrupulous father to divide up the
proceeds, regardless of the child's claims altogether. The new
Rule put a stop to these abuses. The money would be paid into
court, the usual order being that the income should be paid out
from time to time for the child's maintenance. When the infant
attained maturity, the court would usually consider its duty had
been done and pay the principal over to the child itself.
This Rule was not applied in every case in which an infant
plaintiff recovered a verdict, but it was applied with great frequency and it was open to the judge to apply it of his own motion
if the circumstances appeared to him suspicious. In i9o6i
Parliament acceded to a long-continued demand for the creation
of a Public Trustee, 427 and that office was established to administer trusts of all sorts under a government guaranty. After
two or three years the remarkably able administration of the
office won the approval even of its most skeptical opponents, so
that in 19o9 the King's Bench masters proposed to the Rule
Committee that it would be a decided advantage if moneys set
apart under Order XII, Rule 15, were paid over to the Public
Trustee, as he had the facilities and equipment for looking ifter
each case individually and really standing in loco parentis.
Accordingly the Rule was altered, and since then the Public'
Trustee has had the administration of the fund. The Rule was
further strengthened by a much needed addition. Previously
there was no power in the judge to make an order under the
Rule before trial; only "at or after the trial" could he do so.425
But in a very large pi'oportion of accident cases a compromise
would be effected; the defendant would prefer to pay a lump sum
to settle the dispute and prevent the action going before a jury.
In those cases the court was powerless to apply the Rule. Moreover the few solicitors at whom the Rule was aimed would
advise a settlement even where it was not to the plaintiff's advantage, simply to evade the court's watchfulness.
'"6 Edw. VII, c. 5' In 19o5 a short amendment extended Order XXII, Rule r5, to actions
settled before trial, but provided no means by which the court could interfere
of its own motion.
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To meet that situation the Rule Committee took advantage
of the i909 opportunity to alter the opening sentences of the
Rule so that they now read as follows:
"In any cause or matter in the King's Bench Division in
which money or damages -is or are claimed by or on behalf of
an infant or a person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition, no settlement or compromise, or acceptance of money
paid into court, whether before or at or after the trial, shall be
valid without the sanction of the court or a judge, and no
money or damages recovered or awarded in any such cause or
matter, whether by settlement, compromise, payment into court
or otherwise, before or at or after the trial, shall be paid to the

next friend of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's solicitor unless

the court or a judge shall so direct. All money or damages so
recovered or awarded shall, unless the court or a judge shall
otherwise direct, be paid to the Public Trustee. and shall, subject to any general or special direction of the court or a judge,
be held and applied by him in such manner as he shall think fit
for the maintenance and education or otherwise for the benefit
of the plaintiff."
Under the new Rule the money is paid over in every case, with
few exceptions. Since i9o9 there-have been several additions to
the Rule to make the power of the court over costs more extenqive, so that even where there is a compromise the costs may be
taxed and the plaintiff fully protected.
W\'hen pleadings were shorn of their splendor and reduced
to the bare necessities of stating the party's case, the great safeguard of an opponent became the right to ask for particulars.
If a pleading states insufficient facts to enable the opponent to
answer intelligently, he can apply under the summons for directions for particulars, and then for further particulars. This has
the additional virtue of pinning the pleader down to a line of
attack, as particulars, when delivered, are considered to be incorporated with the pleading which they amplify. This explains
42
the Rule added in 19o to the pleading Order: '
"In Probate actions it shall be stated with regard to every
defence which is pleaded what is the substance of the case on
which it is intended to rely: and further, where it is pleaded
that the testator was not of zoulld mind. memory and under-Order XIX,

Rule 25

A.
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standing, particulars of any specific instances of delusion shall
be delivered before the case is set down for trial, and, except by
leave of the court or a judge, no evidence shall be given of any
further instances at the trial."

It makes obligatory the furnishing of particulars in a class of
cases where they are always asked for, and defines the extent to
which they must go, thus saving the expense of the customary
application and the delay caused by.making it. Somewhat akin
to this is the change. commanded in 1903 in the form of general indorsement on the writ in an action for libel. The form
4
previously given in Appendix A to the Rules was: 30
"The plaintiff's claim is for damages for libel."
This was all the information the writ furnished the defendant,
so he was frequently without means of knowing whether he
should appear and fight the action, or acknowledge himself in the
wrong and apologize or settle. To remedy the fault a Rule was
added to Order 111"4 stating that the indorsement should thereafter contain "sufficient particulars to identify the publications
in respect of which the action is brought." As the defendant in
a libel action is usually a large newspaper publisher it is obvious
that the change is appreciated. Careful plaintiffs had often inserted the particulars even before the new Rule, to make assessment of damages easier if the defendant failed to appear.
Among the amendments due to the work of Lord Herschell
in 1893 are two interesting extensions of the powers of chancery
judges in dealing with rights in which classes of persons share,
when all the members of a class are not before the court. The
first is that:
"Where in proceedings concerning a trust a compromise is
proposed and some of the persons interested in the compromise are not parties to the proceedings, but there are other persons in the same interest before the court and assenting to the
compromise, the court or a judge, if satisfied that the compromise will be for the benefit of the absent persons, and that to
'Appendix A, Part III, See. IV.
'Order III, Rule IX.
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require service on such persons would cause unreasonable expense or delay, may approve the compromise and order that the
same shall be binding on the absent persons, and they shill be
bound accordingly, except where the order has been obtained by
fraud or non-disclosure-of material facts."'"
There had always been power in the court, in a-suit properly constituted, to bind the rights of some members of a class whose
interests were represented by others before the court, but the
power to declare a compromise binding was new. The other
amendment is even more useful. It reads:

"In any . . . case in which an heir-at-law, or customary heir, or any next of kin, or a class, shall be interested in
any proceedings, the court or a judge may, if, having regard
to the nature and extent of the interest of such persons or any
of them, it shall appear expedient on account of the difficulty
of ascertaining such persons, or in order to save expense, appoint one or more persons to represent such heir, or to represent all or any of such next of kin or class, and the judgment or
order of the court or judge in the presence of the persons so appointed shall he binding upon the persons so represented."'"
This extended to all cases a power which the court had previously exercised only in cases based upon the construction of a
written instrument.
How complete is the control of the court over those who
It
practice before it is illustrated by a Rule added in i9o.
provides a summary remedy for the clients of solicitors who
retain money or securities which ought to be handed over.
"Where the relationship of solicitor and client exists, or
has existed, a summons may be issued by the client or his representatives for the delivery of a cash account, or the payment
of moneys, or the delivery of securities, and the court or a judge
may from time to time order the respondent to deliver to the
applicant a list of the moneys or securities which lie has in his
custody or control on behalf of the applicant, or to bring into
court the whole, or any part of 4the same. within such time as the
court or a judge may order."''
'Order XVI, Rule 9 A.
'Order XVI, Rule 32 (b).
'Order LII, Rules 25 and 26.
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An order made upon a solicitor under this Rule can be enforced
like a judgment. Recent events had made some such check upon
solicitors necessarv, and it is curious to observe that they are
considered so integral a part of the court that execution may
issue against one without an action having been commenced
against him.
Not all the Rule Committee's procedural innovations meet
with whole-hearted approval, as the following amusing episode
will bear witness. To assure defendants who have paid money
into court, which has been refused by the plaintiff, that the jury
will not be prejudiced by the fact of such payment, a Rule was
inserted in 893 stipulating that
..no communication to the jury shall be made until after the
verdict is given, either of the fact that money has been paid into
court, or of the amount paid in."''
In consequence of this Rule if counsel mention to the jury either
that money has been paid in, or the amount that has been paid,
the judge will, in ordinary cases, stop the trial, discharge the
jury, and make stich order as to re-trial as he thinks proper. But
Lord Russell of Killowen, who succeeded to the Lord Chief
Justiceship soon after the Rule was made, had scant sympathy
with it. In two cases before him he not only refused to recognize it, but himself told the jury how much had been paid in,4 36
and in one of these cases he did not hesitate to express the opinion
that the Rule was "foolish and inconvenient j"437
Examples from the amendments in this category could
easily be multiplied, as it is the largest in point of numbers.
These illustrations will suffice to point out their general trend,
which is clearly towards an ampler measure of official supervision over ever " detail in the course of the litigation. One need
not accept entire the guiding principle, to see that this category
of amendments is the one most rich in suggestions which can with
profit be followed out in other procedural systems.
'Order XXII, Rule

2.

Mentioned in the White Book in the footnote to the Rule.
Klainborowski v. Cooke, 14 TwIEs LAw REPoRTs, 88 (1897).
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XIV.
In the third category into which the amendments since 1883
are here divided can be seen more plainly than in the others how
nearly legislative the powers and functions of the Rule Committee are. It is composed of Rules issued for the operation of
specific Acts of Parliament in which special duties are thrown
upon the Supreme Court, and in which directions are usually
inserted requiring the Rule Committee to issue such Rules. This
method of legislation has the double advantage of relieving
Parliament from the discussion of technical details of legal procedure, and of saving the Supreme Court procedure from inconsistencies and irregularities which might be pitched into it for the
benefit of any particular Act of Parliament. Over thirty statutes
since 1883 have delegated to the Rule Committee the duty to
prescribe Rules to regulate legal proceedings brought under them;
the list is widely varied, and only a few of them will be mentioned, to illustrate the method.
The various Finance Acts that are so prominent a feature
of the collectivist legislation of the present generation create a
large body of new rights and obligations the determination of
whose nature and extent often involves most important issues
and very large sums of money. Parliament has provided an
admirably simple means through which dissatisfied persons can
obtain a judicial review of decisions by the officials who administer these Acts; instead of the Continental method, which is to
create separate administrative courts, or the American method,
which is to send appeals to the executive head of the department,
the Acts very briefly provide that aggrieved persons may, in certain specified cases, appeal to the High Court under Rules to be
prescribed by the High Court for that especial purpose.
Part One of the Finance Act, 1894,438 creates the Estate

Duty which is now payable upon the principal -value of all property, real or personal, settled or not settled, which passes upon
the death of its owner; the Act consolidates and extends previous
taxes laid upon personalty and realty separately, defines the
4n

57 & 59 VICt., c. 30.
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forms of property subject to the new tax, describes the manner
in which the Commissioners of Inland Revenue shall determine
the value of property subject to the tax, and gives directions for
the manner in which the tax shall be collected. The two principal sources of dispute in the administration of the Act are the
determination of value of the property, and the apportionment
of the tax upon its various parts-which are both questions for
the Commissioners, in the first instance, to decide. Trouble over
the first of these is settled according to the following section of
the Act:

43

1

'( i)

Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Commis-

sioners with respect to the repayment of any excess of duty
paid, or by the amount of duty claimed by the Commissioners,
whether on the ground of the value of any property: or the rate
charged or otherwise. may, on payment o, or giving security
as hereinafter mentioned for, the duty claimed by the Commisbioners or such portion of it as is then payable by him, appeal
to the High Court within the time and in the manner and on the
conditions directed by Rules of Court, and the amount of duty
shall be determined by the High Court, and if the duty as determined is less than that paid to the Commissioners the excess
shall be repaid.
"(2) No appeal shall be allowed from any order, direction,
determination, or decision of the High Court in any appeal under this section except -with the leave of the High Court or
Court of Appeal.
"(3) The costs of the appeal shall be in the discretion of
the court.
"(4) Provided that the High Court, if satisfied that it would
impose hardship to require the appellant, as a condition of an
appeal, to pay the whole or, as the case may be, any part of the
duty claimed by the Commissioners or of such portion of it as
is then payable by him. may allow an appeal to be brought on
payment of no duty. or of such part only of the duty as to the
court seems reasonable, and on security to the satisfaction of the
court being given for the duty, or so much of the duty as is not
so paid ..

Under this section the Rule Committee issued a special set of
Rules early in 1895, identified as the R. S. C. (Finance Act)
f895, rllich provide a method of bringing proceedings, placing
the arguments of both sides before the court, hearing the dispute,
" §to.
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and making an appeal from the decision arrived at. 44 0

By refer-

ence certain Rules from the general Orders are incorporated
into the special Finance Act Rules, so the proceedings. under the
section are made to fit in smoothly with the other work of the
court- These proceedings are before what is called the Revenue
Side of the King's Bench Division-the modem remnant of the
Court of Exchequer of old. Where the principal value in dispute
does not exceed £io,ooo, the proceedings are in the local County
Court, and Rules have also been issued by the County Court Rule
Committee for the special purposes of the Act. 44 ' The Irish and
Scotch Courts charged with similar duties have also issued Rules
for their execution.
As to the second source of dispute, the following section
applies:

44 2

"Any dispute as to the proportion of Estate Duty to be
borne by any property or person may be determined upon apl)lication by any person interested in manner directed by Rules
of Court, either by the High Court, or, where the adount in dispute is less than £5o, by a county court for the county or place
in which the person recovering the same resides, or the property
in respect of which the duty is paid is situate."
To meet the requirements of this section all that was done was
44
to add the following to the body of the R. S. C. x883: 3
"An application under Section 14 (2) of the Finance Act,
1894, for the determination of a dispute as to the proportion
of estate duty to be borne by any property or person shall be
made by originating summons in the Chancery Division."
That amounts to a complete code of procedure for the section,
as the R. S. C. give full directions for the disposition of originating summonses and provide forms to be used in connection with
them.
' The Rules are not incorporated with the R. S. C., 1883; they appear in
the 7914 Red Book at p. 11577; also in Hansons and other works on Death
Duties.
"'See Hanson.
§I4 (2)..
'

Order LV. Rule 9 C.
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The i91o Finance Act 444 introduces a form of taxation to
which American legislatures have not yet been converted. It
is knowni as Increment Value Duty; it amounts to a gift to the
public revenue of twenty per cent. of any increase in the value
of land, upon the occasion of any sale thereof, or upon the occasion of its title passing on the death of its former owner. Where
land is held upon charitable or other permanent trusts, the duty
is payable upon periodical occasions as provided in the Act.
Another part of the Act creates a Reversion Duty,44 5 which is
payable "on the determination of any lease of land," and amounts
to a levy of ten per cent. "on the value of the benefit accruing to
the lessor by reason of the determination of the lease." It is
designed to take in the long-term improvement leases so common
in England. In addition there is created an Undeveloped Land
Duty of two and one-half per cent. per annm on the site value
of undeveloped land.'"
All this requires a highly technical system for valuing the
different attributes of real property. The sections defining valuation treat of "gross value," "full site value," "total value," and
"assessable site value," and place much stress upon the hypothetical sensibility of "a willing seller in the open market.'! It
is not surprising that careful provision should be made in the
Act for a review of administrative decisions made under it.
There is set up a panel of expert referees, to whom disputes on
questions of valuation and duty can be referred from the valuers
who, in the first instance, compute the value. If the referee's
decision is likewise unsatisfactory, an appeal can be carried to
the High Court, as in the following. section: 417
"Any person aggrieved by the decision of the referee may
appeal against the decision to the High Court within the time
and in the manner and on the conditions directed by Rules of
Court (including conditions enabling the court to require the
payment of or the giving of security for any duty claimed) ; and
Subsections two, three and four, of Section Ten of the Finance
Act, 1894, shall apply with reference to any such appeal."
"'xo Edw. VII, c.
§(3.
3
•"jx6.

"§33 (4).
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Where the total or site value does not exceed £5oo the appeal lies
to the local county court. Under this section the Rule Committee
issued the R. S. C. (Finance [I9O9-i9io) Act) 1911, assigning
these proceedings to the Revenue Side of the King's Bench
Division, providing for a system of mutual notices of fact and
argument which amount to pleadings, and applying the ordinary
rules of amendment and discovery to them. 44" These sections
illustrate how Acts already technical in their natuic are relieved
of the burden of legal procedural details which are essential to
their successful operation.
An Act throwing heavy responsibilities on the High Court
is the great Trustee Act of 1893, which consolidates the law as
to the powers, duties and liabilities of trustees. 449 It makes the
High Court the tribunal to which applications must be directed
for the appointment of new trustees, the making of vesting
orders, the completion of conveyances, the payment of funds into
and out of court, and sanction for sales and conveyances of property subject to the trust. To regulate the manner in which these
applications should be heard and determined OrdffLLIV B was
added to the R. S. C. in 1893, without any express provision in
the Act that Rules should be made. The new Order assigns all
applications under the Act to the Chancery Division, and prescribes the method in which they should be presented to the
court, whether by petition, ordinary summons, or originating
summons. Another comprehensive consolidating statute-which
refers to the Supreme Court the final determination of disputes
over administrative rulings is the Patents and Designs Act,
I9o7. 45 " Appeals lie from the decision of the Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, on questions of the
extension, restoration and revocation of patents; the Supreme
Court is also specifically required to draft rules regulating appli45 t Rules
cations for the extension of patents for further terms.
a The Rules are not incorporated with the R. S. C., 1883; they appear
in the 1914 Red Book at p. 1578; also in Hanson, tc.
4' 56 & 57 Vict., c. _%
0"1 Edw. VI!, c. 29.

01i8 (1).
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for these subjects, and for the conduct of actions based on patent
infringement, were passed by the Rule Committee in i9o8, and
appear in the R. S. C. as Order LIII A.
No statute of recent years bestows greater power upon the
High Court than the Companies (Consolidation) Act of 19o8;452
it refers to the High Court's decision nearly all the questions
which in American States are brought before special administrative tribunals like commerce and public service commissions. To
take one example, Sections Forty-six to Fifty-six codify the law
as to the right of private corporations to make feductions in their
share capital; their effect is to make the reduction subject to confirmation by the court, upon showing that the rights of all shareholders and creditors will be properly protected. Later in the
58
Act occurs this section, of general application:4
"(i) Subject to the provisions of this Act . . . rules

of procedure for the purposes of this Act, including rules as to
costs anfd fees, tnay be made
"(a) As regardsthe High Court in England, by the authority having power to make rules for the Supreme Court in
England. ...
"(2) The authority having power to make rules tinder this
section may by any such rules repeal, alter or amena any rules
made by the like authority under the Companies Act, 1862,
or any Act amending the same, which are in force at the commencement of this Act."

The Act received the Royal Assent in December, 19o8, and
early in the following year Rules were issued to regulate the
making of applications under its numerous provisions. In May,
19o9. an Order was issued containing Rules applying spe4
cifically to procedure under Sections Forty-six to Fifty-six; '
the Order repeals the old General Orders of the Court of Chancery on this subject, which were still standing; it contains twentyfive Rules on the preparation of the application for leave to reduce capital, the parties who must appear, the evidence which
"'8 Edw. VII, c. 6.
'§23&.
'"The Rules are not incorporated with the R. S. C., 1883; they appear
in the 1914 Red Book at p. 2168 and White Book at p. 2215; also in Palmer's
and other works on Company Law.
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must be presented, the affidavits and advertisements which must
be made, and the costs and fees for the proceedings; and it gives
a complete schedule of forms for use in the course of the application and its final disposition by the court. A further and even
wider rule-making power is conferred by the Act in respect of
the procedure upon "winding-up of companies"; this power is
bestowed, however, not upon the Supreme Court Rule Committee but upon the Lord Chancellor, to be exercised with the concurrence of the President of the Board of Trade. 45 5 The
Winding-Up Rules were also issued in 19o9, and as they contain
two hundred and twenty Rules and over one hundred Forms,
43 6
they are a code of procedure of themselves.
Payment into court is turned to a novel use in the Life Assurance Companies Act, 1896. ST It frequently happens that
life assurance companies, upon the death of a policy-holder, are
doubtful about the persons entitled to a claim upon them as beneficiaries. Rival claimants can be forced to interplead, but sometimes there is only one claimant and yet the company feels that
it cannot safely pay, although it is willing to, because of the risk
of possible superior claims in future, to which it would be no
such a
answer to set up payment to the prior claimant. To meet
43 8
terms:
following
the
in
passed
contingency an Act was
"Subject to rules of court any life assurance company may
pay into the High Court . . . any moneys payable by them

under a life policy in respect of which, in the opinion of their
board of directors, no sufficient discharge can otherwise be obtained.
"The receipt -or certificate of the proper officer shall be a
sufficient discharge to the company for the moneys so paid into
court, and such moneys shall, subject to rules of court, be dealt
with according to the Orders of the High Court."
'§237 of the Act. The Board of Trade is a Government Department,
corresponding somewhat to the United States Department of Commerce and
Labor. The President of the Board of Trade is a member of the Cabinet.
They appear in Palmer, etc.
ss9 & 6o Vict., c. 8.
" 1 4.
Rule 2. These rules are supplemented by Rule 41 (c) of the Supreme
Court Funds Rules, i9o5.
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This is practically the whole Act-an excellent instance of a
statute which expresses a desire of the Legislature, leaving it to
rules to be made subsequently to provide the means for its satisfaction. To clothe the skeleton with flesh the Rule Committee
added Order LIV C to the R. S. C. in October of the same year.
The Order limits the benefit of the Act to cases where no action
is pending in relation to the policy, and prescribes the terms upon
which the payment will be accepted-for instance, that
"The company shall not deduct any costs or expenses of or
incidental to the payment into court.""'1
It also points out the proper procedure for parties desiring
to obtain payment to them of any sums so paid into court.
Under a very different Insurance Act, the High Court is
charged with a similar duty to give relief to those who pay benefits--the epoch-making National Insurance Act, 191 1.400 In a
schedule to that Act are enumerated the classes of employment
in which persons must be engaged who are to benefit by the operation of the Act, and the Insurance Commissioners appointed
under the Act are, in general, the persons who decide whether
any specific employment falls within one of the classes enumerated in the Schedule. Sometimes that question is a most difficult one, and to relieve the Commissioners of their responsibility in such a case, the following section was inserted in the
Act:461

"The Insurance Commissioners may, if they think fit, instead of themselyes deciding whether any class of employment
is or will be employment within the meaning of this Part of this
Act, submit the question for decision to the High Court in such
summary manner as subject to rules of court may be directed
by the court, and the court, after hearing such parties and taking such evidence (if any) as it thinks just, shall decide the
question, and the decision of the court shall be final."

Directions under this section form the subject of Order LV
B, added to the R. S. C. in May, 1912. The Order briefly directs
that such a submission should be made by proceedings instituted
in the Chancery Division by an originating notice of motion, to
-I

'§66

& 2 Geo. V,e. ss.
(iii).
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be served by the Commissioners on the person or persons as to
whom the question has arisen, and to follow the same course and
be subject to the same regulations as any other originating motion in the Chancery Division.
Alterations in substantive law frequently carry with them
the necessity for corresponding accommodation in procedural details. The Guardianship of Infants Act, i886,462 is a case in
point. That Act increased materially the right of an infant's
mother to have a voice in its guardianship. Before the Act she
had no power to appoint a testamentary guardian for her infant;
the Act empowers her to do so if the father is dead. It also
makes her the infant's guardian if the father dies without having
appointed one. A new right given her i.i that of nominating
someone to serve after her death as guardian jointly with the
father, if the latter is for any reason unfitted to be the sole
guardian of the child. Finally the Act expressly provided that
the Court, in making orders regarding the custody of the child,
shall have regard to "the conduct of the parents, and to the
wishes as well of the mother as of the father." To carry out
_hese provisions, Section Eleven says:
"Rules for regulating the practice and procedure in any
proceedings tinder this Act, and the forms in such proceedings,
may from time to time be made
"(a) so far as respects the High Court or Her Majesty's
Court of Appeal in England or Ireland by Rules of
Court..
By virtue of this section the Rule Committee, in December,
1887, issued a set of thirteen Rules, cited as the R. S. C. Guardianship of Infants. 4" 3 They assign to the Chancery Division applications made under the Act, apply to them specifically certain
Orders of the R. S. C. 1883, and direct what evidence they must
contain, and upon what persons they must be served, in order to
satisfy the court before it will act.
49 & 50 Vict., C. 27.

The Rules are not incorporated with the R. S. C., 1883; they appear
in the 1914 Red Book at p. 1563 and White Book at p. 2140; also in Daniell's
and other works on Chancery Practice.
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Other statutes effecting alterations in substantive law, for
which practical details were supplied by the Rule Comittee,
were the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882,44 and the Partnership Act, i89o. 4 5 Under the former, Rules have been issued by
the Committee to provide a method for registering bills of saleone of the salient requirements of the Acts. 466 The Partnership
Act contains a section 46 7 conferring upon any judgment creditor
of an individual partner the right to have an order charging that
partner's interest in the firm property and profits with the payment of the debt, and to have a receiver appointed to receive that
partner's share of the firm profits. The section also permits the
other partners in the firm to redeem an interest so charged, or to
buy it in at a sale. Directions for the practical operation of this
section were added to the R. S. C. in June, i89i, as Rules i A
and i B of Order XLVI, which define what is sufficient service
to bind the partnership for the purposes of the section.
Mention has been made of the fact that for the purpose of
making rules to regulate the winding-up of companies the rulemaking power is reposed not in the Rule Committee but in the
Lord Chancellor, to be exercised with the concurrence of the
President of the Board of Trade. Certain other large bodies of
rules have likewise been issued by authorities other than the Rule
Committee, under the direction of specific statutes. Of these the
Rules whose application in the daily business of the High Court
4
is most frequent are the Supreme Court Funds Rules of 1905, 68
which are made, under the authority of various Judicature
Acts, 4 9 by the Lord Chancellor with the concurrence of flie
Treasury, and now consist of one hundred and eleven Rules.
4"'4 & 42 Vict., c. 3r, and 45 & 46 Vict., c. 43.
53 & 54 Vict., C. 39.
h'The Rules are not incorporated with the R. S. C., 1883; they appear
in the 1914 Red Book at p. x589. Also in Reed's and other works on Bills

of Sale.

"'§23 (2).
"'These appear in the 1914 Red Book at p. 1654 and White Book at p.
1720.
" §x8 of the Chancery Funds Act. 1872; §§17 and 3o of the Judicature

Act, 1875; §6 of the Judicature Act, 1894; §4 of the Supreme Court Funds
Act, 1883.
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They constitute a complete code of directions to parties and to
the Paymaster's office regulating the payment of funds into and
out of court for every possible purpose, and their disposition
while they are subject to the court's control. A generous appendix of forms is part of the Rules.
These examples illustrate the special service the Rule Committee is able to perform for the Legislature. It not only relieves
the latter of the burden of debating purely procedural matters
connected with the ordinary practice of the courts, but in every
case where the creation of new substantive rights and liabilities,
or the inauguration of policies throwing open wider fields of administrative discretion, makes it necessary or advisable to refer
disputes to the court, the filling in of details for the regulation of
legal proceedings can safely be left to the court itself; and that
has the further advantage of giving the court that control over
its own procedure which is essential to maintain it as a consistent and organic whole.

Xv.
Three categories of amendments still remain to be examined
-the fourth, dealing with the duties and powers of officers of
the court, the fifth, altering the time within which different steps
in a litigation may be taken, and the sixth, on the subject of
costs. Of these three only the last has the same attraction, from
the comparative standpoint, as the three classes previously summarized, but a few samples will be presented from each, for the
sake of completeness.
The amendments in the fourth category embody directions
to officers of the court for the proper distribution and administration of business coming before it. There is a considerable
and of clerical officials
staff of quasi-judicial officers
of varying degree, whose powers and duties are subject
to alteration by Rules of Court. Occasionally the distribution of work among the judges themselves is made
the subject of an amendment. although it is usually left to
be regulated by Resolutions of the judges in each Division, as
when the judges in the Queen's Bench Division issued the Resolutions of May, 1894, or the Notice as to Commercial Causes, in
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1895. Two most important amendments in the R. S. C. altering
the arrangement of the judges' work have already been described
in a different connection-one is the creation of the linked-judge
system in the Chancery Division, and the other is the creation of
the Short Cause List in which a large part of the trials under
Order XIV are entered to avoid delay.
One group of amendments in this category is for the benefit
of the masters in the different departments of the Supreme Court.
One amendment permits any master, on the application of any
party, to hear and dispose of any application in a cause which has
been assigned to another master ;47 this is to facilitate the speedy
determination of interlocutory points when, for any reason such
as illness or pressure of other work, the master to whom the
cause has been assigned is not available. Another concerns
Chancery masters alone; 47' it instructs them to report, at the beginning of each sittings, all the cases in which they consider there
has been any undue delay in the proceedings before them. This
is an echo of the work of the Chancery Chambers Committee in
1885, the belief then having been expressed that much of the delay in Chancery chambers was due to the laxity of solicitors
themselves. Frequent amendments are made to increase or alter the powers of the King's Bench masters; two of the most useful are those which empower such masters to try issues in garnishee proceedings, 4 "-' and which extend to them the power to
make charging orders, under the I &

2

Vict. C. I IO 47--both

powers which are invoked almost every day in the master's work.
At present the assessment of damages after an interlocutory judgment is not, in actual practice, usually procured upon a
writ of inquiry. The usual course is for the matter to be referred
to the master who has had scisin of the action, to hear the evi'Order LIV, Rule 9 A (888).
XXXIII, Rule 8 A (z893).
'Order
XLV, Rule 4 (1902).
LIV, Rule 12 (e) (1911). If any judgment debtor has stocks or
shares standing in the books of any company in his own name or in trust
for him, his judgment creditor can obtain an order charging those stocks
'Order

"'Order

or shares with the payinent of the debt, and if the debt is not paid within
six months after such order, the creditor can have the stocks or shares sold to
satisfy the charge.
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dence and assess the damages; but by virtue of an amendment
made in j888.47 ' if the assessment is of a particularly involved
and complicated nature it may be referred to one of the official
referees. who are specially equipped for the taking of lengthy
accounts, and so the master's time is not taken up.
From the King's Bench masters an appeal lies to a judge of
the King's Bench Division who sits in chambers daily for the

purpose. At present the King's Bench judges take the chamber
work in rotation, each generally remaining there throughout a
single sittings of the court. This is the result of-a series of
changes in Order LIV in an attempt to arrive at the most satisfactory arrangement; the procedure before the Judge in Chambers is regulated by Rules Thirty to Forty-two of that Order, and
they were recast in 19o8 and i9o9. There will probably be further changes in this Order, as the opinion has recently been expressed that it would be advisable to do away altogether with
4 5
the appeal to a Judge in Chambers. 7
\hen the revisers in 1883 gathered together the scattered
strands of chancery procedure, they abolished completely the old
system of administering interrogatories through the official Examiners in Chancery, a cumbersome and unsatisfactory method
of getting answers; under it only the set questions could be
asked, and no cross-examination was possible. Upon the retirement in 1884 of the old Examiners in Chancery a new set'of officials was provided, called merely examiners and available for
all Divisions of the Court. They are persons appointed by the
ILord Chancellor before -whom witnesses may be examined and
cross-examined outside the court whenever permission is given to
do so, especially in cases where expert testimony is to be taken.
The method of referring examinations to these examiners, the
procedure before them, the fees to be paid, and the filing of evilence taken, are all regulated by Rules issued principally in 1884,
and partly in

i888 and

Igoo.

4

7"

SOrder XXXVI, Rule 57 A.
See Appendix VIII (vol. II. p. 236) of Minutes of Evidence taken
before the Royal Commission on Delay in the King's Bench Divisicn. rarl.
Pap. Cd. 7178 (1913).
'Order XXXVII, Rules 40 to 54
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Another group practically of great concern to the Law
Courts deals with the matter of office hours and vacations, the
subject of Order LXIII. This Order has been amended quite
frequently, 477 and fixes the limits of the Long Vacation, the holidays during the legal year and the daily office hours to be observed in the different departments of the Central Office. At
present, most of the offices are open daily from 10.30 to 4.30, and
Saturday to i. In the courts, the Long Vacation lasts from
August i to October 12: the Christmas recess lasts three weeks,
the Faster recess two weeks, and the Whitsun recess ten days. The
- offices, however, are not so generously dealt with, as they are open
every day in the year except Sundays, Good Friday, Faster Eve,
Easter Monday and Tuesday; Whit Monday, August Bank Holiday (the first Monday in August), Christmas Day and the next
day, and the King's Birthday.47 s
A great administrative power regulated by Rule of Court is'
the proper investment of funds "in court." These often amount
to very large sums, especially in the Chancery Division, and the
office of Paymaster-General is one of great responsibility. The
securities in which he may invest are enumerated in Order
XXII. Rule 17, and the list is frequently altered by the
deletion or addition of names according to the financial situation
and the appearance of new issues that are officially safe."7" The
Rule applies to all "Cash under the control of, or subject to -the
order of the CourL"
The new Poor Persons Rules of 19i441 are the latest addition to the administrative group of amendments, as they create a
new bureau to perform the functions of a Legal Aid Society, hut
it is too early to judge of their usefulness.
The fifth series of amendments relates to the time within
which steps may or must be taken by parties in the course of an
action. Under the far-reaching influence of the compulsory summons for directions, rules on time present little or no difficulty
4
"

883, i9o7, z8,

x912.

Order LXIII, Rule 6.

;888, 1897,

1899, 1901, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1908, 1911.

Order XVI, Part IV;

WEEKLY NoTES, January 24,

1914, p. 63.
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to practitioners, as there is always the possibility of obtaining
from the master leave for an extension of time; in fact it is
strongly felt that too great indulgence is shown in this regard,
the practice being that any-party will be allowed one extension
of time at some point in the action, as of course, the costs being
made costs in the cause and paid by the ultimately losing party.
Quite one-fourth of the applications made to the masters in the
The
King's Bench Division are upon these "time summonses."
following
the
in
contained
is
power to grant such applications
4
Rule: 81
"The court or a judge shall have power to enlarge or
abridge the time appointed by these Rules. or fixed by any order
enlarging time, for doing any act or taking any proceeding, upon
such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require, and
any such enlargement may be ordered although the application
for the same is not made until after the expiration of the time
appointed or allowed."
'rhe manifest advantages of the right to exercise such a discretion seem to offset the inconvenience it sometimes entails.
The principal time provisions in the Rules are in respect to
the delivery of pleadings. At first it was not compulsory for
parties to issue a summons for directions-they could simply follow the times laid down in the Rules and deliver pleadings mutually accordingly. Since 1897, however, the time within which
any pleading must be delivered is a matter for the master to decide upon the hearing of the summons for directions, as well as
the question of whether or not there shall be any pleadings at all,
so that the times stipulated in the Rules are not of any importance. The present time8 2Rule for statements of claim, for instance, reads as follows:'
But the order for pleadings commonly made includes a line
to the effect that a statement of claim shall be delivered in four"When delivery of a statement of claim is ordered the same
shall be delivered within the time specified in the order, or, if no
time be so specificd. within twenty-one days from the date of
the order, unless in either case the time be extended by the court
or a judge."
Order LXIV, Rule 7.
* Order XX,Rule i (c).
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teen days, and a defence ten days thereafter, so that the twentyone days mentioned in the Rule serves no other purpose than to
stand as a guide to the master's discretion when extensions are
asked for. The Rule as to the time for defence is similarly
worded and fixes the time at ten days, 4' 3 so there is no divergence
between the Rule and the practice. Replies are very commonly
put in by plaintiffs because of the great latitude of counterclaim
that defendants may plead, although no reply will be allowed by
the master, as a rule, where no counterclaim has been pleaded.
The Rule on replies allows ten days from the defence for their
delivery,S and the order made is usually for the same period.
The times stated in the first and third of these Rules were much
longer tinder the original Rules of 1883; then the plaintiff was
allowed six weeks for his statement of claim and twenty-one
(lays for his reply. The abridgement was made in i9o2 when
the pleading Orders were revised to eliminate the confusion
caused by the newly compulsory summons for directions. The
time for defence, on the other hand, was then increased from
eight days to ten.
A most useful privilege allowed the plaintiff is that -he may,
without having to obtain leave, amend his statement of claim
once at any time within ten days after the defence is delivered ;4
the time was cut down from twenty-one
days to ten in 1905, to
Rule on replies.
make it conform to the
Several changes have been made in the time prescribed for
interlocutory steps. The Order on chamber procedure directed
that every summons must be served at least two clear days before the time when it was to be heard in chambers; 486 it was
found that when a-party desired to apply for an extension of time
he was usually in a hurry, and to require him to serve two clear
(lays' notice of his intention to apply would practically defeat the
object of his application. An addition was made. in i891, to the
effect that
'Order XXI, Rule &
" Order XXIII, Rule 2.
'Order XXVIII, Rule 2.
-'Order LIV, Rule 4 E.
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"in case of summonses for time only, the summons may be
served on the day previous to the return thereof,"
and the difficulty was no longer felt. Another alteration in the
same Order was made, in the time within which appeals must be
carried to the Judge in Chambers from the decision of a master.4 7 The Rule required that the appeal must be entered in the
Judge's list within four days after the decision complained of,
hlut there was no limit within which notice of the appeal had to be
served on one's opponent. In 19o5 this was extended to five days,
with a proviso that notice of the appeal must he served at least
one clear day before the hearing. This assures to the respondent
a fair opportunity to prepare, which previously a discourteous
appellant could deprive him of by serving the notice late. A small
change was made in the Order on payment into court. When a
defendant paid money into court the plaintiff had four days in
which to decide whether to accept the sun in satisfaction of his
claim or leave it ;4 18 in 1913 this was extended to seven days, to
give him a little more time to think it over.
Under the English Rules, when the pleadings have reached a
certain po)int the plaintiff, if he proposes to push his case to trial,
must give his adversary a "notice of trial" and then, within fortyeight hours, enter the action for trial. Formerly he was allowed
six weeks "after the close of the pleadings" within which to
serve his notice of trial, but that time has been curtailed. He is
now entitled to give the notice with his reply, whether there are
subsequent pleadings or not. and if he fails to do so within six
weeks thereafter, the defendant may either apply to have the action dismissed or may himself give notice of trial. 48 9 In practice it rareh" occurs that there are pleadings after the reply, so
this change is not an important one. There are certain, cases in
which, even though the order made on the summons for directions has been for a nlon-jury trial, the defendant has the right,
after receiving notice of trial, to elect that the trial shall be before
a jury; he must then apply to the master for an order to that efOrder LIV..Rule 2T.
'Order

XXII. Rule 7.

'Order

XXXVI, Rule 12.
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fect. 4 91

When this Rule was framed in 1883, no time limit was

placed upon the defendant, so he could upset his opponent by delaying the application, but in 1885 the defect was corrected by
requiring that the application must be made "within ten days after notice of trial has been given."
Appeals must now be entered much earlier than they were
formerly allowed. The 1875 and 1883 Rules fixed the time attwenty-one days for appeals from interlocutory orders and one
year for other appeals; 49 ' in 1893 both of those limits were cut
down, the former to fourteen days, and the latter to three months.
And in 1913 the three months was further reduced to six weeks,
so that now appeals from interlocutory orders must be entered
within fourteen (lays, and appeals from final judgments within
six weeks. This is subject to the right either of the court below
or the Court of Appeal to extend the time if it sees fit-a reservation explicitly stated in the Rule in 1913 to counteract certain
decisions which held that very special circumstances were required. Motions for new trials have been very largely assimilated to appeals, and this is reflected in the time allowed; previously it was ten days from the trial, not counting vacations; in
1913 it was altered to six weeks from the trial, irrespective of va49 2
cations.
The sixth and last category in the arbitrary classification
here attempted contains the amendments on costs. These refer
principally to the incidence of or liability for costs--a kind of
question which frequently is the source of more animated discussion in an action than the principal issue itself. It is partly
due to what has been called the "apothecary's bill" method of
itemizing bills of costs, and partly to the fact that both solicitor
and barrister are employed at so many stages of an action, that
the costs for every trifling interlocutory application in the course
of an action in the English Supreme Court are sufficient in
amount to make their payment a matter of consequence, and to
" Order XXXVI. Rule 6.
-Order LVIII, Rule T5.
"'OrderXXXIX, Rule 4.
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raise the whole status of legal costs to a plane quite disproportionate to its true.relation to the rights involved. It is illuminating
to notice that the Order on costs in the R. S. C. (Order LXV)
is by far the longest Order of the whole seventy-two. With the
foot-notes it takes up one hundred and ten pages in the last number of the Red Book, and one hundred and thirty pages in that of
the White Book; the average Order occupies only seventeen.
However, the evil is one that has flourished for many long years
and is almost taken for granted, and it is of interest to observe
how the Rule Committee has endeavored to put the burden of
costs where it should most justly fall, whenever there seemed reason for intervention. Only a few instances can be given here, .as
the subject is necessarily one requiring an intimate acquaintance
with the procedural steps involved.
On the common law side (ever since the Statute of Gloucester) costs are recovered by a successful litigant from his unsuccessful opponent, but in the Chancery Division the usual order is
that the costs be paid out of a fund which is the subject of dispute. The court is consequently obliged to look at the question of
the incidence of costs from a different angle than in the King's
Bench Division, and to decide how best the fund itself can be
protected. With this object in view, a few Rules were added
among the Rules of 1893 to serve as a guide in certain puzzling
situations. One is: 493
"The costs occasioned by any unsuccessful claim or unsuccessful resistance to any claim to any property shall not be
paid out of the estate unless the judge shall otherwise direct."
This warns the custodians of trust property against needless
litigation, the practice being that if the claim or resistance was
The second of
reasonable, the judge will "otherwise direct."
49 4

these Rules is more obviously beneficial:

"The costs of inquiries to ascertain the person entitled to
any legacy, money. or share, or otherwise incurred in relation
thereto, shall be paid out of such legacy, money, or share, unless the judge shall otherwise direct."
- Order LXV. Rule 14 A.

-Order LX\ r. Rule 14 B.
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This affords a just protection to the residuary beneficiaries
against errors not their own. The third Rule is a complement to
the second: 4
"Where some of the persons entitled to a distributive share
of a fund are ascertained, and difficulty or delay has occurred
or is likely to occur in ascertaining the persons entitled to the
other shares, the court or a judge may order or allow immediate
payment of their shares to the persons ascertained without reserving any part of their shares to answer the subsequent costs
of ascertaining the persons entitled to the other shares."
In a country where it is so common for property to be distributed several generations after the method of distribution is
marked out, these two Rules are an unmixed blessing to waiting
distributees.
Probate costs are also charged upon the estate of the testator, and similar questions sometimes arise in the Probate Division. A most salutary Rule, made part of the one just above described, in 19o4, is: 4 "

"In any probate action in which it is ordered that any
costs shall be paid out of the estate, the judge making such order may direct out of what portion or portions of the estate
such costs shall be paid, and such costs shall be paid accordingly."
In one case, for instance, it was decided that the costs of
proving the will should be charged upon certain realty, the corpus
of the estate, and not paid by the life tenant, the judge throwing
out the suggestion that the amount might be raised by a mortIn another case, the costs of all pargage upon the property. 49 7
ties were ordered to be paid out of the residuary share of four
defendants (there being six residuary beneficiaries), these four
defendants being held to have caused the litigation. 498 Another
amendment on probate costs is on a matter connected with pleading. The R. S. C. 1883 continued a practice of the old Ecclesiastical Courts whereby a caveator had the right to demand that the
'Order LXV. Rule 14 C
'Order LXV, Rule t4 D.
" Dean v. Bulmer, I t9o51 Prob. D. i, per Jeune, P.
" Mentioned in the headnote to Dean v. Bulner.
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proper execution of the will be strictly proved, without having to
pay the costs of the proceeding. The Rule was:
"In probate actions the party opposing a will may, with his
defence. give notice to the party setting up the will that he
merely insists upon the will being proved in solemn form of
law, and only intends to cross-examine the witnesses produced
in support of the will, and he shall thereupon be at liberty to do
.o, and shall be subject to the same liabilities in respect of costs
as he would have been, under similar circumstances, according
to the practice of the Court of Probate."
But this left it open to parties to contest a will wantonly and
force the executors to prove its proper execution at the expense
of the estate, whether there was reason for it or not. The loophole in the generosity of the old practice was stopped by an
amendment to the Rule in 1898 which makes it end as follows:
"and he shall thereupon be at liberty to do so, and shall not in
any event, be liable to pay the costs of the other side. unless the
judge shall be of opinion that there was no reasonable ground..

for opposing the will."

A few months later an opportunity came to apply the new
Rule.

In Spicer v. Spicer,5"' the President of the Probate Divi-

sion (Sir Francis Jeune) said:
"The case is an example of the precise abuse which the new
Rule was intended to prevent,"
and ordered the defendants to pay the executors' costs.
Several of the costs amendments apply more particularly to
questions common to the King's Bench Division. It has been
described how a defendant may pay money into court, as a means
of compromise, "with a denial of liability." If the plaintiff accepts the money so paid, he must withdraw his action; if, however, he rejects it and goes on with the action, certain consequences as to costs ensue. If he eventually wins a verdict greater
than the amount paid in, the defendant of course gets no benefit
from the payment in. But if the plaintiff recovers less than was
paid in, the defendant ought not to be liable for any costs incurred subsequently to the time of payment in. The old practice
was that in such a case the defendant was liable only for the costs
of issues on which he failed; this was not a rule of court but a
40 Order XXI, Rule 8, before amendment.
[z8W] Prob. D. 38 (November, i898).
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rule of practice confirmed by a long line of decisions1 0° But
this benefit was wholly illusory; the principal issue would usually
be that of liability, and the issue of amount ditc only a minor
one. The defendant, therefore, although he had actually paid
in a sum greater than he was found to owe, would be obliged to
pay the costs on the principal issue in the action, because that was
an issue on which he failed. To relieve defendants of this, and
to furnish a real inducement for them to pay money into court
so as to avoid further litigation, the following sentence was added
to the R. S. C. in i913:502
"A plaintiff who does not accept money paid into court
with a denial of liability, but proceeds to trial and does not recover more than the sum paid into court, shall not be allowzecd
his costs of the issues as to liability unless the judge is satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for not accepting the
sum paid in."
Under this Rule the defendant will have practically no costs
to pay after the time of payment into court.
Similar in character is an addition made earlier to the interpleader Order. When a sheriff, who had by mistake seized goods
of some one other than the debtor, was notified by the execution
creditor to release the goods, there was always a question about
how the costs of seizing the goods and of releasing them should
be distributed; the sheriff would contend he must be completely
reimbursed by the execution creditor, while the latter would argue the sheriff ought to bear the costs of his own mistake. To
put an end to the difference a Rule was made in 1889 dividing
the liability. The Rule states that if, upon hearing of the third
party's claim, the execution creditor notifies the sheriff that he
admits it,
"he shall only be liable to such sheriff or officer for any fees
and expenses incurred prior to the receipt of the notice admitting the claim."' 03
The question of execution involving a third party was also
the cause of an amendment to the Order on attachment of debts.
"Cited in the footnote to Order XXII, Rule i, in the White Book.
Order XXII, Rule 6 (c).
'Order LVII, Rule i6.
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Garnishee proceedings under the R. S. C. are aimed principally
at the attachment of debts due the judgment debtor. In cases'
where the garnishee disputed his liability, there was a diversity of
opinion as to how the costs of proving it should be bornewhether they should come out of the sum recovered, or fall upon
the execution creditor, or upon the garnishee. To settle this a
Rule was added in igoi, and now the practice is that, as regards
the costs of the judgment creditor, they
"shall, unless otherwise directed, be retained out of the money
recovered by him under the garnishee order, and in priority to
the amount of the judgment debLt."'
An amendment on costs which applies to all 'classes of actions and is constantly being acted upon was made to Order LXV,
Rule 23, in 1902. Previously the Rule allowed the masters, when
they directed the costs of any interlocutory application to be paid
by any party, to fix and order a lump sun] to be paid, to save the
expense and delay of taxation. In 1902 the Rule was extended
to cover the costs of the whole action, and it is often applied especially in smaller actions of the running-down type, and in actions entered in the Short Cause List where with the court's approval settlements are often effected before trial.
This conspectus of the amendments since 1883 does not pretend to have mentioned all the changes of prominence and importance. The effort has been to select, from the various types to
which they conform, such amendments as will illustrate, to one
not closely familiar with the R. S. C., the wide range of the Rule •
Committee's powers and the gain in flexibility to be derived from
entrusting the regulation of civil procedure to a professional
body rather than to a well-intentioned but overworked legisture.5'
Samuel Rosenbaum.
London.
*"Order XLV, Rule 9.
" Section XVI of this article will be published in the -Law Quarterly Re-view. April. 1915. under the title "Rule-making in the County Courts"; Sections

XVII and XVIII in the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation

(London). July. 1915. under the title "Rule-making in the Courts of the
Empire". Section XIX has appeared in the Law 'Magazine and Review (London), February. 1915, under the title "The Rule Committee and its Work".

